Posted by evanduq on July 11, 2009
Here’s a little diddy that I wrote earlier today. For this.
The Royal Society’s Attentions: Then and Now
Why should we care about an analysis of the joint attention, action, belief, and intention of the Royal Society at its beginnings and now? Improving natural knowledge, among the multitude of other activities the Society engages in, is still very relevant. The Royal Society is fast approaching its 350th anniversary, and it, no doubt, will be a major player in the near future’s heightened issues with and awareness of climate change. Prince Charles recently gave a speech at the Richard Dimbleby lecture titled “Facing the Future,” in which those themes were at the forefront. Any institution which might be involved in the coming debates must have some direction and stance on the issues, even if there is internal debate within the institution itself. I feel that the Royal Society is healthy enough to take on challenges with joint cooperation as an institution within the larger scientific community.
How much has the Society changed from its first beginnings? From its first beginnings as a meager gathering of men sharing close common social interests in taking no one’s word for it in the realm of natural science and empirical investigations, it has grown into a vast society within society at large. As an institution working against “a background of group identities, culturally accepted norms, practices and stances, and biologically basic capacities for joint actions and attentions,” the Royal Society represents just one of many instances of concerted human and technological effort toward whatever might constitute the reality of “progress” in the present’s becoming past and future.
In this paper, why skip most of the material in between then and now in the history of the Royal Society? Not to downplay the significance of the history of the Royal Society in between then and now, but I find that it perhaps suffices to focus mainly on then (the beginnings) an now (the present day) as key “moments” in order to look beyond them to future points of interest and developments.
What am I ultimately trying to get at in the paper? I hope to let unfold, in my investigations, a coherent picture of the Royal Society as a social reality with joint attention, action, belief, and intention. The scope is limited but aims at a brief generalization based on two instances of analysis. I want to emphasize the role of networks of people and their interpretations of natural phenomena based upon experimental observation and use of technology. The world has come from an era of primarily hand-written letters on paper sent through the intermediary of human messengers to the age of email and cellular communications over digital networks and the airwaves. I hope to find some clear results and the implications that they might hold.
Posted in Philosophy | Leave a Comment »
Posted by evanduq on July 11, 2009
“So, Polemarchus said, am I then to be your hier in everything [including the argument]?
You certainly are, Cephalus said, laughing, and off he went to the sacrifice.” [331d]
Tonight I am going to work on the Republic [331d-336b].
What is owed to you? What do you owe to another? Is justice simply the settling of our debts as atomistic individuals in an overall static state of affairs? Surely it would not be just to all to settle a debt that most likely will directly harm the greater good. Would it? There are ”fuzzy” (such a bad word to use) areas. Justice doesn’t operate in isolation. Like everything else, context matters. First, let us appeal to the wise elders to impart their wisdom on the matter. Simonides, a lyric and elegiac poet, has a reputation for being a wise elder. It seems that, since his thought has “stood the test of time,” he would be a good rock upon which to base our claims and further investigations into the matter of what justice is. But why appeal to figures with a reputation for authority in the first place? They aren’t around to speak anymore, but their opinions count. It’s just like Marxists quoting Karl Marx or other previous philosophers in an invented tradition that has led to present day Marxism. Imaginary dialogues happen all the time. Presently, this is a case in point. A thinker comes around with a novel idea or a new way of doing something and either true believers, imitators, or further innovators emerge. I suppose in Plato’s time there might have been “Simonidists” who practiced Simonidism, eh? There still are Platonists out there, y’know. Let’s defend the Simonidist position.
What did Simonides state about justice, and why might he be, at least in some sense, correct? Polemarchus: “He stated that it is just to give to each what is owed to him.” [331e] Ok. Why might this not be the case? More specifically, we should go beyond and break down the superficial formulation of the definition to get at what is really meant by the phrase in order for us to defend Simonides’ position. Didn’t Humpty Dumpty say something about being able to make words mean whatever he wanted them to mean? He might have made a good defense attorney. I forget. Oh well. At any rate, maybe the most we can arrive at is what Simonides didn’t mean when he said what he said.
To do good to someone (to make better) or to harm someone (to make wose). These actions constitute the dichotomy of the situation when it comes to defining justice as a virtue. Ultimately, justice is a form of giving each what is owed to him or her by doing good or by making people better, because what is owed to each is precisely that. Enemies are even meant to be made better through justice. That is not to say that we want to make the enemies better at being enemies (that would be to do harm to them). We want the enemies to change in quality by making them better. In Polemarchus’ and Socrates’ dialogue, we gain the knowledge that being just, like being a good doctor, farmer, shoemaker, etc is being good at doing something well. It is to possess virtue. To be just is to have that quality. I have said that justice is a form of something. But just what is that form besides the possession of virtue? What is virtue? At any rate, we saved Simonides from saying that it is just to give each to what it is owed to him by simply doing good to friends and bad to enemies. At least I think we did.
Now Thrasymachus has to get his two cents in…
Posted in Ancient, Philosophy, Platonism | Leave a Comment »