Working on Concepts v.2

As The Fellow Says: "You can't learn how to swim without getting into the pool."

Archive for July 14th, 2009

How Good Is Your Ring Of Gyges?

Posted by evanduq on July 14, 2009

We all have one. They make up part of our existence. Each one of our rings of Gyges may be imperfect, but the fact is, we can’t get them off of our fingers. Yet, even if there are times when our rings are woking quite well (making us invisible to one another) we still cannot fail to affect the fabric of the space-time continuum. We are still visible to the eyes of God. Is there such a thing as divine justice? Or are we just trying to approximate to the Idea of pure justice by making social contracts? This is what I glean from tales of Book II of the Republic. But we shouldn’t rely on tales or old memories. We should experience the phenomena for the first time or refresh our memories by going to the text itself. Before moving on to that, however, I would like to explore the phenomena associated with being imperceptible. Didn’t someone famous say esse est percipi or something of that sort (I think it was Berkeley.) meaning that to be  is to be perceived? Invisibility is just one aspect of being imperceptible though. Invisibility is one of the, if not the primary, means of providing witness based upon observation. The rings of Gyges has to do with making its wearer invisible. Now, if my musings about the situation have any relivance, then I would like to look into the issue of each individual’s invisibility from one another (as is evidenced when complete privacy is attained, i.e., when the only question to be asked is about where someone is).  This issue, no doubt, deals with an individual’s presence in space and time. This presence is a presence not merely to the direct apprehension of other beings capable of perception and conception. It is a presence of the individual in “the world,” in “reality.” Who did it? This is a question which deals with an individual’s identity and responsibility for his or her actions. How does justice figure into this? Is it morally reprehensible to do unjust things. Of course it it. That’s an analytic truth. The concept of “moral reprehensibility” is  a priori packed into the definition of “unjust.” This is not to say that some may take the unjust things to be good. Types of rewards may be gained to the unjust character. For instance, it is generally agreed upon that lying is wrong, unjust, and morally reprehensible. But in pretty much all circumstances the liar may stand to benefit greatly, or at least a decent amount, from lying if the lie goes undetected. BUT ALL OF OUR ACTIONS HAVE REAL WORLD CONSEQUENCES! It would stand to reason that lies cause more disorder than there already is in existence. Right? The jerks use their power of “imperceptibility” to secretly act like jerks. Good people use their “imperceptibility” to do good. This is the difference between vice and virtue. We all have invisible facets, faces even invisible to ourselves.

On to the text: Now the game is to really convince, not just to persuade. Is there a difference?  Should justice be counted among that which is “welcomed for its own sake”? Should it be a means to an end? Or should it be counted as both? I don’t know. I suspect that it would be the third option. Justice should be counted as a good in itself because it should ultimately be satisfying and a pleasure to the conscience to know that one has something (the quality of being just) that it is welcomed for its own sake. And that justice as a system, method of action, or institution in the real world is a means to that end of having justice as something welcomed for its own sake. Like, seeing is a means to an end (sight) and sight is, for the most part, pleasurable in itself. This is not to say that the functions of the other organs are not means to their own forms of self-contentment. Next, we have the city and the soul. We don’t get into the soul much but we talk about justice as it pertains to the well ordered city. A city of pigs, a city of luxury, and a city that needs protection from the self-destructive nature of the first two cities. This hierarchical structure is a running theme throughout the rest of the book if my memory serves me well. Stomach = the multifarious desires. Breast = the seat of courage. And the head = the seat of reason which moderates between the two. At least I think so.

I wish my reason had more control of my courage/motivation and desires. Then my room would probably be a lot cleaner…

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